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Anatomy of a Trade: The Making of a Subprime CDO*
Steven H. Kasoff†
Author’s Note
This article presents a short story, a sketch in eight parts of a single fictitious subprime
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transaction. The story is informed by expert interviews,
documentary research, and the author’s firsthand experience.
This anatomy of a subprime trade breaks down the different parts of the CDO origination
process and shows the ways that they connect. The fictionalized format helps do that as
vividly as possible. The timing of the story’s chapters shows the sequence of key events in
the creation of a typical CDO, beginning with a hedge fund manager’s proposal to his
investment committee. From ensuing scenes inside a large Wall Street dealer to the buy-side
investor’s discussion, we see various players interacting with each other. The give and take
from the different sides distills the different perspectives documented in the expert
interviews into one imaginary deal.
The fictionalized account also allows the anatomy of the subprime trade to move freely,
unconstrained by real-world confidentiality concerns. In conducting our oral history
research, we recognized the obligations of the investors and market actors we interviewed
to maintain complete confidentiality on matters pertaining to their present and former
employers and clients. Our standard interviewing rules, therefore, were to not ask about or
discuss particular deals, people, or firms they had been involved with. There are no real
clients or counterparties in this story.
Writing in the story format also helped us to distill the essence of the events, players, and
deal structures. This anatomy, therefore, is a simplified, stylized version of what typically
was happening during the subprime CDO era. Many of the more technical details naturally
fell by the wayside. For more complete and technical details, the reader should refer to the
interview summaries and full transcripts at the Yale Program on Financial Stability archive.
The reader will find two graphics that help visualize the pieces and links within a CDO deal.
The first shows the structure of a typical CDO. The second depicts the trades and parts of a
synthetic subprime CDO in which a hedge fund has participated on the short side. A glossary
of key terms follows the story.

*

†

This article is part of a special project of the Yale Program on Financial Stability–Lessons Learned Oral History
Project: Inside the CDO Machine, which can be accessed at our website here,
https://som.yale.edu/centers/program-on-financial-stability/lessons-learned-oral-history-project.
Yale School of Management Fellow and former equity partner and head of real estate and structured products
investments at the Elliott Management Corp., a global hedge fund.
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Delving into the details of the subprime CDO trade of 2005–07 is potentially valuable in two
regards. First, it helps us come to a better understanding of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
specifically the ways that the subprime market was connected to the key factors and
dynamics that propelled contagion throughout the global system. Second, beyond the GFC,
we suspect that students of financial crises will recognize particular dynamics and patterns
in the CDO deal-making that transcend this particular era and relate to other crises—past,
present, and future.
We hope that the reader finds the story illuminating and is inspired to read the interviews.
As the interviews demonstrate, the scenes detailed in the anatomy story will be completely
familiar and recognizable to those who lived through that period—a “real fiction,” a genuine
representation of one deal from start to finish.
Disclaimer
The following is a series of fictionalized descriptions of actual behaviors and activities observed
by the author, directly or through contemporaneous secondhand accounts of others. These
descriptions are a mosaic of many such observations; as such, none of the parties or events
described represent any specific firm, person, or singular event, including the author or his
former employers, and any similarities are purely coincidental.
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Hedge Fund Internal Meeting
Presentation by Portfolio Manager to Investment Committee (excerpt)
Fall 2005
Background
•

The market for subprime mortgages has grown significantly in recent years.

•

This growth has been fueled by historically low interest rates and strong home price
appreciation (HPA) in all regions.

•

Housing affordability is poor, pushing additional borrowers into subprime.

•

Subprime borrowers are stretching to buy homes that they can’t afford, both in terms
of price (LTVs above 80, and often above 90) and budget (DTI above 40).

•

These borrowers have the worst credit scores—it is not atypical to see younger
borrowers, first-time home buyers, and self-employed workers. Most also have
significant other installment debt (auto, cards, etc.).

•

More recently, loan underwriting standards have fallen, and it is now common that
borrowers don’t document income, employment, assets, etc.

Subprime RMBS Structure
•

Typically, 70–80% of the capital structure is AAA, with skinnier tranches at each
rating category below that.

•

We focused on BBB tranches, which generically represent the 2–6% slice of the
securitization, e.g. 2% subordination and 6% thick. Losses exceeding 7–10% of the
mortgage pool will wipe out this tranche (this threshold exceeds the subordination
amount because most structures can also use excess spread to absorb losses).

•

RMBS servicers typically advance unpaid mortgage P&I (principal and interest) to the
structure. When defaulted mortgages are eventually resolved, any collections first
reimburse these advances, which will increase the severity of loss severity.

•

Despite being so junior in the structure, the BBB rating drives demand from real
money investors such as insurance companies, and in recent years, the fast-growing
“ABS CDO” market. Please refer to the attached diagram.

•

BBB tranches (and often there are separate BBB+, BBB, and BBB- tranches) trade
between LIBOR+100 and LIBOR+300, with variations based on rating, collateral
quality, and market conditions.
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Investment Proposal and Rationale
•

Subprime borrowers represent the bottom 10–20% of the mortgage market by credit
quality. In the event of even a mild recession, they are disproportionately more likely
to encounter financial stresses that could lead to an inability to pay their mortgages.

•

Most RMBS pools have high geographic concentrations in states that have
experienced significant HPA in recent years (CA, FL, AZ, TX, NV). A correction in home
prices in these regions will increase loss severities, likely well beyond the market’s
expectations. (We also believe negative HPA correlates with higher default rates.)

•

BBB tranches can be shorted using the newly standardized “pay-as-you-go” CDS. We
would trade under existing ISDAs and trading lines. The cost is similar to the trading
spreads on the cash tranches (e.g., 100–300 bp). Unlike corporate CDS, these CDS do
not expire—they last for the entire life of the reference tranche.

•

Initial margin (IM) will be 3–6% of notional (2–3x the CDS spread). As the product
matures, we expect that margin requirements will drop further. However, even at
these IMs, the trade is very efficient to carry.

•

Domestic consumption is a major driver of the US economy. In a recession, even a
mild or regional event, consumption is the key underlying factor connecting (1) the
stock prices of our core long positions and (2) subprime borrower financial health.

•

Therefore, subprime CDS represents a highly leveraged option on US macro
conditions. Although priced as a very out of the money (OTM) option, we believe the
potential for payoff is far higher than implied by market prices.

•

Comparing subprime CDS to our other hedges (mostly S&P puts and 10-year Treasury
calls), we find this to compare very favorably and recommend reallocating a large
portion of our hedge book into this product.
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Figure 1: Structure of a Typical CDO

Source: Created by Yale Program on Financial Stability.
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Large Investment Bank/Broker-Dealer Internal Meeting
RMBS/CDO Structuring/Trading Desk—Transcript (excerpts)
Fall 2005
RMBS Head Trader: As you know, we recently agreed with the rest of the Street on the final
ISDA docs for the standardized “pay-as-you-go” CDS. It was a long night in a windowless
conference room, with a lot of stale pizza. But I can already say that it was worth it.
Risk Manager: I agree with that as well. When we first started trading subprime CDS, each
confirm was bespoke and negotiated with the counterparties. Unlike trading bonds, or even
some of the vanilla corporate CDS, we can’t just assign the old trade over to the new
counterparty. There’s no central clearing either. So, if we bought protection on something
for 125 bp and then sold protection on that same thing to someone else at 135 bp, we still
have some risk. Both trades will live on our books for years. We did make 10 bp running,
which might have a PV [present value] of a half point. And yes, we book that into P&L
immediately. But if something goes wrong and the credit event terms don’t match in the two
trades, we could have real exposure. With the standardized template, we still live with two
trades, but at least the terms match exactly and we don’t have any residual risk except
counterparty credit. I can say that our regulators and auditor are also very pleased with this.
RMBS Head Trader: Thanks. Now that you’ve put everyone to sleep, let me say what we all
actually care about. Our customers like this product, and they want to trade it. A lot. Our
volumes are up a ton, and the bid/ask in the market has held up. You can all see the P&L, and
it’s going to get even better. Even if we tighten the bid/ask, which we might want to do, so
we can be a dominant market maker.
Structured Credit Sales Manager: Let me expand on that thread. This trade is getting a lot of
attention in the hedge fund community. We certainly pitched it aggressively at the ABS East
conference a few weeks ago in Boca. But it’s taken on a life of its own. The hedgies love it.
And these are guys that never traded RMBS before. They’re smart guys and have done some
homework, but they’re really just focused on it as a macro trade. They don’t know how to
analyze these structures. Some of them don’t even have Intex, but they’re still trading, just
from the pool strats in the prospectus. They don’t know which shelves trade rich or anything
like that. So, I think bid/ask spreads will hold up for a while. The scale of demand is big, and
they’re impatient to get the trade on.
Head of CDO Structuring: So, as everyone knows, the hedge funds are on the short side of this
trade. And apparently some of the banks, our competitors, are also holding a lot of the shorts
for themselves. On the long side, we’ve been placing some of this with insurance companies
and other real money investors, but as volumes grow, it’s clearly the CDOs that will buy most
of it. We’re seeing it already. Ramping up a normal ABS CDO is so hard. It takes months, and
we have to warehouse that risk along the way. Now that timeline gets compressed. We make
just as much per deal. Actually more, since we can make the deals larger. And we can do even
more deals.
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Risk Manager: I wanted to ask about the collateral posting. There’s a mismatch there, right?
Also, I mentioned counterparty risk a few minutes ago—
RMBS Head Trader: Sorry to interrupt. Actually, not really sorry. By the way, do you even
need to be at this meeting? Stop worrying about counterparty risk. The hedge funds are all
on the short side. If the market blows up, we don’t need to worry about their credit, because
their trades will be in the money. And the CDOs hold cash collateral. So, no risk there, right?
Head of CDO Structuring: Yes, that’s an important feature of the synthetic CDO. Even though
the CDO’s “assets” are all synthetic, e.g., they’ve sold protection via CDS, the CDO tranches
they create are still cash. So those AAA, AA, A, etc. tranches that we sell are for cash. That
cash sits in a trust within the CDO, and if there’s a CDS credit event, we just call up the CDO’s
trustee and they send us some of that cash.
Risk Manager: But we have a funding exposure, don’t we? If the trade goes in the money for
the hedge fund, we post collateral to them. But we don’t get any from the CDO. I know it’s
there; it’s not a credit risk. But we have to fund the difference, unlike a normal back-to-back
between regular counterparties, where we’re posting and receiving equal collateral.
Head of CDO Structuring: Well, yes, that’s true. But not a big issue. You said it—no credit risk,
just funding temporarily. What’s our balance sheet now? $100 billion? 200? Our CP trades at
LIBOR minus 5. I think we can swing this without breaking a sweat. But if it really bothers
you, there are some European banks that would intermediate this for us. So, we’d face them
on the CDS, and then they face the CDO on a back-to-back. I think they’d charge us 5 bp
running, which is a great business for them and a dumb thing for us to do.
RMBS Head Trader: Well, this is so fascinating . . . It reminds me why I couldn’t stand being a
structurer and moved to trading. What everyone needs to know is this—how the market
really works. The CDO managers, when they start ramping up a deal, they come up with a list
of the best subprime bonds. Yeah, that’s an oxymoron, but whatever. Even the hedge funds
know those are not the ones they want to short. Or they will but at a tight spread. Then my
structurer friend here needs to have a tough call to explain that the CDO portfolio needs to
have enough yield for us to syndicate the whole thing. So now they need to hold their nose
and look for slightly hairier subprime bonds that they’re willing to buy. So that works, sort
of. The yield is good but not great. The arb still doesn’t work.
Head of CDO Structuring: That’s the nature of the product. The CDO assets need to yield
enough to pay the CDO tranches and still have something extra left over. Otherwise, no one
would create them. A good CDO manager will find ways to generate yield, but they’ll do it
smartly. That’s why they’re getting paid.
RMBS Head Trader: Is that so? I’ll take your word for it. Now back in the real world—what
actually happens is that there are a couple smart hedge funds. They also know the difference
between regular crappy subprime originators and the really horrid ones. And they do an
OWIC. Get it? Like a BWIC, bids wanted in comp, when you sell a bond? But they’re soliciting
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people to offer protection on the worst subprime bonds they can find. And guess what? Those
CDO managers that you guys think are so talented—that you take to London, Frankfurt,
Singapore, and Tokyo, spending my profits on unnecessary boondoggles—they convince
themselves that it’s OK to have 5% or 10% of their portfolio in those turds. That’s how they
get the yield they need, and my structuring friend here puts it into his Excel, and he’s happy.
And like he said, the timeline is fast, and the deal closes, and we make a nice profit. If it
eventually goes sideways, I’m glad you’re the ones that’ll need to explain it to your accounts
that you sold it to.
Conversation Among Principals of Soon-to-Be Created CDO Manager (currently
employed at large mutual fund company)
Summary of Email Exchange
January 2006
Portfolio Manager: Our annual bonuses get paid next week. As soon as the checks clear, you
and I need to be ready. We’ll both resign on the same day.
Senior Analyst: I’m ready but a bit nervous. I know it’ll be a big step for me, but I’m worried
about the risk. How long before we can start taking a salary? You’ve already made a lot of
money. I don’t have much saved up.
Portfolio Manager: I’m putting in a lot of that cash to fund the start-up expenses. And I’m
giving you equity in the business. I told you already that the team at our favorite investment
bank is ready to open a warehouse for us and start taking us on the road to meet investors.
Senior Analyst: I know. We have a good track record. Will our current employer let us use
those numbers? Can they stop us?
Portfolio Manager: Sure, we can use it. And everyone knows us anyway. A lot of that is
publicly available. You just stay on top of the market. A few weeks after we leave, we’ll be up
and running at our new office. And you can start buying as much of the new issue pipeline as
you can. We need to ramp up that first deal fast, so we can get it into the market. Then we
start receiving fees.
Senior Analyst: How many deals do we need to do before the fees cover our running costs?
Portfolio Manager: Probably two or three. Then after that it all goes to the bottom line. We
should be able to crank out a deal every quarter. In two years, we’ll have $4 billion of AUM.
Do the math on the fees from that!
Senior Analyst: That’s a lot of bonds to buy. Can we use CDS also? That would make it much
easier.
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Portfolio Manager: Sure. You’ve seen these synthetic CDOs? More and more. The banks love
them too! They have hedge funds banging down their doors to short subprime. Those guys
have no idea which deals are good or bad. Some of the banks are even shorting too.
Senior Analyst: The banks? Why would they do that? Are they worried about the market?
Portfolio Manager: A lot of reasons that might not have anything to do with the market.
Maybe they’re hedging their RMBS origination business. Or even these warehouses they do
for us. They take that risk themselves. Or some risk manager decided it was a good idea.
Maybe they’ll even short some bonds to us, to help speed up the ramp up of our deal.
Senior Analyst: You know they’re about to launch the ABX Index. What if all those hedge funds
and banks just want to short that? We can’t just buy ABX as the assets for our CDO. Our
investors expect us to build a differentiated portfolio.
Portfolio Manager: The dealer’s trading desk will handle that. If a hedge fund shorts ABX and
the dealer buys it, then what happens? They can’t sell it to CDOs, as you pointed out. And I
think the CDOs have priced everyone else out of the market. So, the dealers just synthetically
sell us some other subprime bonds. That’s what they do. They keep that basis risk on their
books. Just like how the corporate CDS traders have been doing for the last few years.
Senior Analyst: And you really think the hedge funds will buy protection on the better
subprime deals? They don’t know the difference? I heard a rumor that a bunch of hedge funds
were doing group trips to see the housing markets in California, Arizona, Florida. I think
they’re starting to get smarter on this.
Portfolio Manager: Some will. Others will just think it’s a macro trade and buy anything. And
some will decide that they’re too cheap to short the bad deals. They’ll want to short the better
deals because the spreads will be lower.
Large European Commercial Bank Internal Communication
Email from Internal Treasury Manager to Senior Department Head (excerpt)
February 2006
I would like to follow up on our meeting last week regarding investments in CDOs backed by
US subprime risk. During that meeting, you commented that the lending environment that
the bank faces in its core business lines has become very competitive. In some key markets,
the bank must lend at levels that are unprofitable, such as for long-standing corporate
customers or to maintain market share or franchise perception. The proposed investments
in subprime CDOs can provide a level of profitability that may help offset these lower-margin
areas.
We propose a significant investment of the bank’s balance sheet in CDO tranches with ratings
of AAA, AA, and A. These tranches carry spreads over LIBOR well in excess of similarly rated
alternatives, yet carry the same requirements for reserves, under both the existing and
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proposed new regulatory and risk-based capital rules. As such, the ROE to the bank is very
compelling.
In the case of AAA-rated tranches, we can expect yields of L+30 bp. In contrast, AAA-rated
corporates yield less than LIBOR. We can also buy insurance on the tranches from a monoline
insurance company at a cost of 8–10 bp per annum. While arguably unnecessary from a
credit perspective, doing so reduces the regulatory capital required to zero. As we fund our
balance sheet at LIBOR minus 5 bp, we net earn 25 bp running, while using no capital; an
infinite ROE (return on equity). This is the “negative basis trade” we discussed.
Tranches rated AA and A yield L+60 bp and L+150 bp, respectively. The capital required is
low as well, also making these investments very efficient and with high ROEs. By comparison,
A-rated corporates yield L+30–40 bp.
There were a number of questions asked about the risks of the US housing market, and in
particular the subprime part of that market. It is correct that subprime borrowers have
weaker credit than prime borrowers. It is also correct that loan underwriting standards have
deteriorated in the past two years. These headline risks are the primary reason that yields
are wider than for similarly rated alternatives. However, that risk is mitigated in a number
of important ways, leading to our conclusion that subprime CDOs represent an excellent riskreward profile. The mitigants are summarized below.
1. Asset value: Subprime mortgages represent a first lien on the home. These mortgages
are originated at 80–90 LTV. Even if we accept that the borrower is not a strong credit,
the fallback for repaying the mortgage is anchored by the value of the house.
2. HPA history: Our economics team has done a robust macro analysis of the US housing
market and believes the downside risks to be small. While the market may cool off,
and could even drop in select regions, such a scenario is unlikely to result in
significant default rates. In fact, at the national level, the US housing market has not
experienced a year-over-year drop in house prices since the 1930s.
3. Homeowner equity: As mentioned in #1, homeowners have equity in their homes. This
provides a first-loss cushion in the event of a default. Additionally, it provides a sense
of ownership that is important for borrower behavior. Homeowners will likely
continue paying their mortgage regardless of the home value unless they experience
a stressful personal event such as loss of employment.
4. Structural subordination in the subprime RMBS: The BBB tranches of the subprime
RMBS securitizations typically have 4–5% subordination. Historically, lifetime losses
on subprime mortgage pools have been less than 2%. Therefore, the losses need to
significantly exceed historical levels before those tranches will absorb losses.
5. Structural subordination in the CDO: Even if losses occur as described in #4, the CDO
offers another layer of subordination. Subordination levels for the A, AA, and AAA are

388

Anatomy of a Trade

Kasoff

typically 10%, 15%, and 30%, respectively. Therefore, losses on a few outlier RMBS
will not impact our CDO tranches. Only if a significant portion of the underlying RMBS
experience losses will we be at risk.
6. Rating agencies: The rating agencies have devoted significant time and resources to
monitoring and rating these transactions. As risk-averse organizations that have been
in business for nearly a century, and without the profit goals of other financial market
players, they have a strong incentive to preserve their reputation. As such, we believe
the ratings are likely conservative estimates of the true risk.
7. CDO manager expertise: We have conducted numerous meetings with CDO managers
and have ranked them according to their skills and experience. While there is no
doubt that some RMBS tranches are riskier than others, we believe that the CDOs we
will propose for investment have savvy CDO managers that will navigate the market
effectively.
Hedge Fund Internal Phone Call
Conversation between Portfolio Manager and General Partner—Transcript (excerpt)
March 2006
Portfolio Manager: Hi. I wanted to run a new idea by you. We’ve been shorting subprime for
a few months now and have a decent position. There’s good liquidity in ABX, so we use that
a lot. But as we’ve built up our research capabilities, we’ve been able to identify subprime
deals that have much riskier mortgages in them.
General Partner: Yes, that’s great work. I want to keep shorting those deals. As much as we
can. Even if it’s more expensive than ABX.
Portfolio Manager: Right. Totally agree. The problem is that the CDO managers still have
some discipline. We’ve found some deals where the risks are layered in subtle ways, and the
CDO managers don’t mind taking those. But most of what we want to short . . . the CDO
managers don’t want. If we pay up, they’ll take a few here and there, but it’s limited. And
we’re not the only hedge fund trying to get these.
General Partner: OK, so what’s the new idea?
Portfolio Manager: I’ve been talking to one of the dealers, and they have a new CDO manager
that they’re trying to help launch. These are guys with a decent reputation. They recently left
a big mutual fund company, and they had a five-star rating. But they want to get a couple
CDOs ramped up quickly. So the opportunity is for us to “partner” with them, to sponsor the
deal.
General Partner: Partner? What does that mean?
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Portfolio Manager: Well, “partner” is the wrong word. Our relationship will still be arm’s
length. But we’re going to put a list together of 50–100 subprime tranches that we want to
short. Not all of them can be the crappiest deals, but a lot of them can be. The CDO manager
might kick a few out, but we’ll negotiate to get a list that we all agree on—$500 million of
total size. We’ll short the whole thing, and the new CDO will take the long side. Instant rampup for them and block size for us.
General Partner: OK, that sounds good. At what price?
Portfolio Manager: The dealer will validate that it’s a midmarket price, and maybe they’ll take
a few basis points out for themselves. But we get a big trade on right away, without having
to fight in the market on the bid lists. The CDO manager is under pressure to get started, so I
think they’ll accept more of the bad subprime bonds than others might.
General Partner: So, what do you think the average spread will be on our shorts? Maybe 250
bp? So $500 million, we’ll pay $12.5 million per year? That’s a lot, so let’s make sure we’re
shorting enough of the ones we really hate.
Portfolio Manager: OK, so here’s the part that’s most interesting. We’ve seen a few other
hedge funds do this already. Not only will we short the subprime tranches into the CDO, we’ll
also buy the equity tranche of the CDO.
General Partner: Buy it? Explain that to me.
Portfolio Manager: I just emailed you a diagram that describes the CDO and the trades we
would do. Keep in mind that the equity is only 4% of the CDO. So $20mm of investment. But
while the portfolio is performing, the equity will pay out $5–$6mm per year, depending on
how tightly the other CDO tranches get priced. So, of the $12.5mm per year that we pay as
CDS premium into the CDO, the CDO uses about $7mm to pay interest costs on the senior
tranches. Then the rest of it gets paid to the equity tranche, so we’re getting back almost half
of what we paid. And we’ve only given up the first 4% of upside on the shorts.
General Partner: I see it now. It’s like a correlation trade. If the CDO portfolio has losses on a
few of the bonds we shorted, our gains on the shorts will be offset by losses on the CDO
equity. But the market and the rating agencies and everyone else have mispriced the
correlation.
Portfolio Manager: Exactly. How could only a few of these take losses? If some do, then the
housing market is rolling over and subprime borrowers are defaulting en masse, and most of
the other deals will take losses too. It’s sort of like all or nothing. We save almost half the cost
of the short position, and we only sacrifice the first $20mm of potential gains.
General Partner: I love it. It means we can increase our position size to a lot more than what
I was targeting. For the same cost. And so, if we’re wrong and the market never cracks, this
CDO equity just keeps paying out $5–$6mm per year?
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Portfolio Manager: Yes, but it’s even better than that. If you own the equity, or technically
just a majority of it, then you also have a call option. After two years, you can basically unwind
the whole trade. The CDO, the short positions, everything. With our other shorts, or ABX,
there’s the mark-to-market risk. If spreads tighten, it marks against us. And we just keep
paying the CDS costs for maybe five to seven years until the deals pay off.
General Partner: Wow, this market makes my head spin. There’s so much that’s mispriced!
This CDO equity basically has a call option on a high vol asset. The other CDO tranches are
short that option. Do the senior tranche buyers even know it?
Portfolio Manager: I don’t think so. They buy it because they look at the ratings. And the
spreads are higher than on other stuff with the same ratings. They don’t speak our language.
Correlation, vol, etc.
General Partner: Clearly, that’s true. The guy buying the CDO’s BBB tranche? He’s just above
our equity in terms of risk. It’s almost the same risk if you understand how high the
correlation is. And the CDO equity gets 25% returns, and the BBB gets L+325. Wow. Even if
the market falls apart, if it takes a few years, then the CDO equity could have a positive return
and the BBB will take a bath. So the more junior tranche is actually less risky!
Portfolio Manager: Yes. In fact, I know you’ll love this. The next thing we’re working on is
trying to short the CDO tranches. The BBB or the single A. For exactly the reasons you just
said. The risk is even more mispriced and concentrated than for the subprime bonds.
General Partner: This is unbelievable. Someday, someone’s going to write a book about this.
Let’s try to keep our positioning as quiet as possible. I don’t want to be in that book . . .
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Figure 2: Synthetic Subprime CDO with Hedge Fund Participation

Source: Created by Yale Program on Financial Stability.
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Hedge Fund Portfolio Manager and Head Trader at Broker-Dealer’s ABS/CDO Trading
Desk
Phone Call Transcript (excerpt)
April 2006
Hedge Fund PM: Hey, has your structuring team heard back from the CDO manager? We’d
love to get the portfolio finalized so we can execute the trade.
ABS/CDO Trader: I know, I know. But you keep proposing really ugly subprime bonds, and
they’re getting tired of rejecting them.
Hedge Fund PM: Good. That’s the idea. If they’re so worn down and anxious to get this done,
they should just accept my revised portfolio. And by the way, I did also add a few of the
better-quality subprime deals. I hope they appreciated that.
ABS/CDO Trader: They did. But those also trade at tighter spreads, so it’s helpful and also not
helpful.
Hedge Fund PM: Well, sorry, that’s how markets work. The better stuff is more expensive!
ABS/CDO Trader: Thanks for explaining that to me. I’ve only been market-making for 15
years.
Hedge Fund PM: And did you ask your structuring team about the CDO bucket? Could our
CDO own 5% or 10% of other CDO tranches? We’d really like to short some of those. In
return, we could also remove some of the other subprime bonds they hate. That should be a
win-win.
ABS/CDO Trader: Structurally, it’ll work. The rating agencies have already let a few other
deals do this. We just need to convince our CDO manager. They didn’t love it.
Hedge Fund PM: So, do you think they’ll eventually agree? You can be very persuasive when
you want to be.
ABS/CDO Trader: Thanks. That’s why I do this job. Not for the money. It’s really for all that
validation from smart guys like you. OK, but seriously, I think we can make this happen, but
there’s another condition.
Hedge Fund PM: Of course there is. How much will it cost me?
ABS/CDO Trader: No, it’s not like that. We’ll find a way to get this. The CDO will have maybe
7% or 8% allocated to BBB tranches of other CDOs. But you don’t get to short all of that into
the CDO. You need to share some with me.
Hedge Fund PM: You want to short some of these CDO tranches? I thought you were just a
market maker.
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ABS/CDO Trader: Yes, but this isn’t really a market. You’re not the only hedge fund that wants
to short CDO tranches. And no one wants to be long them. Well, not enough people anyway.
And every new CDO that gets created just adds to the supply. The last few CDOs we did, we
couldn’t sell all of the BBBs. So guess who is the proud owner?
Hedge Fund PM: You could sell them today if you wanted to. Just not at par.
ABS/CDO Trader: You’d like to think so. In fact, with all the fees we earned from those CDOs,
my basis in the BBBs is actually just 95. And guess how many bids I have there? The market
is really thin. You want them?
Hedge Fund PM: Funny. So you want to short those CDO tranches into our CDO?
ABS/CDO Trader: Maybe. That would be great. But it could be different CDOs instead. They’re
all basically the same risk, right? But I need to take half of it. If we can get $40 million of our
CDO portfolio allocated to other CDO tranches, I get to short $20 million, and you can have
the other half.
Hedge Fund PM: OK, if that gives you enough incentive to make this happen, and quickly, I
suppose I can live with that.
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CDO Preliminary Offering Circular1
Risk Factors—Conflicts of Interest (excerpt)
May 2006
Initial Equityholder may enter into credit derivative transactions relating to Collateral
Securities in the Issuer’s portfolio. On or after the Closing Date, the Initial Equityholder may
enter into credit derivative transactions relating to a substantial portion of the Collateral
Securities in the Issuer’s portfolio, under which it takes a short position (for example, by
buying protection under a credit default swap relating to such obligation or security) or
otherwise hedges certain of the risks to which the Issuer is exposed. The Issuer and
Noteholders will not receive the benefit of these transactions by the Initial Equityholder and,
as a result of these transactions, the interests of the Initial Equityholder may not be
consistent with those of Noteholders.
Certain Conflicts of Interest Involving the Initial Purchaser. The Initial Purchaser or its
Affiliates may structure issues of Collateral Securities and arrange to place such Collateral
Securities with the Issuer. The Initial Purchaser or an Affiliate thereof also may have acted
as underwriter, agent, placement agent, or dealer for a significant portion of the Collateral
Securities.
CDO Manager Portfolio Manager and Head of CDO Structuring at Broker-Dealer
Phone Call Transcript (excerpt)
May 2006
Head of CDO Structuring: Our syndication process for your CDO is almost done. All of the
tranches except the BBB are oversubscribed, and that’s not far off. But the levels are a bit
wider than we had modeled.
CDO Manager PM: Why is that? How much wider?
Head of CDO Structuring: Well, there’s a few reasons. The market’s been up and down lately.
Nothing fundamental, as far as I can tell, but there are a lot of other CDOs in the market right
now. And a big pipeline of deals that everyone wants to get into the market before summer.

1

This section is sourced from the offering document of an actual (and very typical) 2006 CDO, with only minor
edits. These paragraphs represent a very small portion of the “Risk Factors” section, which is more than 40
pages long. The first paragraph discloses that the anonymous investor (likely a hedge fund) that is buying the
equity tranche is also taking short positions in many of the assets owned by the CDO. This creates potential
conflicts of interest because this investor may have influenced the selection of those assets (although that risk
is inadequately disclosed) and the investor may not have bought the equity tranche because they expected it
to perform well.
The second paragraph discloses that other assets bought by the CDO may have been structured or
underwritten by the dealer structuring this CDO. Implied is that the dealer may still own those assets and
have an incentive to sell some of those assets to the CDO.
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We also had two investors pass on your deal. They decided that they’re not going to buy deals
from a “first-time manager.” But they liked you and will probably buy your next one.
CDO Manager PM: OK, but you’re still going to price it?
Head of CDO Structuring: Yes. We have approval to take down up to $10 million of your BBBs
if we need to. But we’re going to price that 25 bp wider than we modeled. The rest of the
capital structure is close to the model. It averages to about 3–4 bp wider for the whole CDO.
CDO Manager PM: That’s OK, right? You said after we price this one, you could open a
warehouse for our next CDO. We’d really like to get started.
Head of CDO Structuring: Yes, we’re working on getting that credit approved. For this CDO,
though, the extra 3–4 bp of funding cost just means that you need to get a bit more yield into
your portfolio. I emailed you some thoughts on how you could do that.
CDO Manager PM: You want me to buy the BBB tranche of those other CDOs. Those are deals
you underwrote, so I assume you couldn’t sell them? And also swap out a few of the better
RMBS for some riskier ones.
Head of CDO Structuring: You’re the CDO manager, of course, and the credit decisions are
entirely yours to make. That’s not something we want to be involved with. I was just
presenting the math. There are a lot of constraints in managing a CDO, as you well know. And
what I emailed was just a few hypothetical ideas that would make the math work. Anything
else you come up with, as long as the math works . . . that’s up to you.
CDO Manager PM: Great. You say that, but then you show me a very aggressive offer on those
bonds you want to sell me.
Head of CDO Structuring: Sure, that’s the trading desk. He decides what price to offer it. Think
of it as a favor. It’s a better price than you can get from any other dealer on anything similar
in risk. He’s axed, that’s true. He wants to sell it. But he could’ve offered it to someone else
too.
CDO Manager PM: OK, fine. I’ll have my guy call him later today. It’s just a small part of the
overall portfolio. I really want this deal done so we can start working on the next one. And
listen to me, for this next one, you need to give me time to buy bonds in the market. I don’t
want to do this again, where we let a hedge fund short the whole portfolio.
Head of CDO Structuring: I get it. And you’ll have more time. But everything is a trade-off, and
everything has a cost. You got really fast execution by doing it this way. And we charged less
too since we didn’t have to hold your warehouse risk for two months. Even when you’re
doing it your way, just remember it’s still the hedge funds that drive the other side of this
trade.
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CDO Manager PM: Yes, I get it. It’ll be really nice a year from now. I’m imagining the global
ABS conference next year. Maybe we’ll all be hanging out at that club in Barcelona. The one
by the beach. The housing market will be up another 10%, and these hedge funds will want
to get out of their money-losing shorts and move on to something completely different.
Maybe I’ll buy them a few drinks and try not to gloat.
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Glossary



2/28 ARM or 3/27 ARM

Two commonly marketed types of subprime mortgage. The
interest rate on the mortgage would be fixed for either two or
three years (usually at a very low “teaser” rate). After that
point, the mortgage would become an adjustable-rate
mortgage (ARM), in which the rate would reset periodically,
but at a higher spread above a benchmark interest rate for the
remaining 28- or 27-year period.

ABCP

Asset-backed commercial paper. A short-term investment
vehicle that matures between 90 and 270 days. Typically,
firms use ABCP to finance short-term needs. [James Chen,
“Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP),” Investopedia,
updated May 12, 2020,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asset_backed_com
mercial_paper.asp].

ABS

Asset-backed securities. A type of fixed-income security
whereby a pool of assets is deposited into a special purpose
entity, and one or more securities (often called “tranches”) are
issued. The cash flows of those securities are backed by the
cash flows generated by the asset pool. Typically, the assets
are those that have stable and predictable cash flows,
especially when pooled together so that the risks of individual
assets are offset by the benefits of a large and diversified pool.
The most common forms of ABS are those backed by
mortgages (MBS, CMBS, RMBS), credit card receivables, auto
loans, or other debt (CDOs).

ABX Index

A standardized CDS product that was created in 2006. The
initial ABX Index comprised 25 tranches from recent
subprime RMBS transactions. Market participants could buy
or sell protection on those 25 tranches with a single trade. As
a result, ABX was highly liquid (more so than CDS on
individual subprime tranches) and was used actively by many
in the market to hedge risk or speculate.

Matthew A. Lieber contributed this glossary.
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Aircraft ETC

Aircraft equipment trust certificate. A form of ABS in which
the assets being securitized are large airplanes, typically
under long-term leases to established airlines. The ETC
benefits from the predictable cash flows during the lease term
but is exposed to risk at the end of the lease, based on renewal
lease rates or aircraft residual values at that time. The ETC is
also exposed to the airlines’ credit risk.

Alt-A

A classification of residential mortgage that was used in the
years before the GFC. Alt-A mortgages did not satisfy the
criteria for prime mortgages but were less risky than
subprime.

arb

Arbitrage. CDOs are sometimes referred to as “arbitrage
CDOs.” For a CDO to be economical to create, the sum of the
values of each tranche must be equal to, or greater than, the
cost of purchasing the assets to be owned by the CDO.
Although not an arbitrage in the classical sense, when used in
this context, the “CDO arb” is meant as a shorthand for the
relative value between the yield on the CDO assets and the
required yield to sell the tranches. When the CDO arb is larger,
the expected return to the equity tranche will increase,
leading to more CDOs being created. Eventually, the increased
supply will cause tranche yields to increase and/or drive
down the yields of the assets. In either case, an equilibrium
level will be achieved.

AUM

Assets under management. For companies that manage
money for a fee, on behalf of clients, AUM is the primary
measurement of size. Since most investment management fee
arrangements are a simple percentage of AUM (hedge funds
are the main exception), a company with more AUM will have
proportionately higher revenue.
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BWIC

Bids wanted in “comp" (competition), also referred to as a bid
list. A common process used by both dealers and investors to
sell illiquid securities, such as ABS or CDO tranches. Similar to
a traditional closed auction, a list of securities for sale is
circulated to interested parties. At a specific time, bids can be
submitted, and the seller will sell each bond to the highest
bidder. Typical market practice is for the seller to disclose to
all parties the “cover bid” (next highest bid) but not the
winning bid, which protects a buyer that may have overpaid
(e.g., a “wide cover”). If none of the bids meet the seller’s
“reserve” price, the bond will not trade.

CDO

Collateralized debt obligation. A form of ABS in which the
assets being securitized are other forms of debt. The most
common form of CDO is the collateralized loan obligation
(CLO), which is backed by syndicated loans of large, noninvestment-grade corporations. For a few years before and
during the GFC, there was significant issuance of CDOs backed
by tranches of subprime RMBS, often referred to as “ABS
CDOs” or “subprime CDOs.”

CDO squared

A less common form of CDO. A CDO squared would own
tranches of other CDOs. In 2007 and early 2008, CDO squareds
were at times created as a way for dealers or other owners of
CDO tranches to sell off some of that risk.

CDS

Credit default swap. A derivative product whereby two
parties agree to exchange risk on a specific asset, such as a
corporate bond, or ABS tranche, known as the “reference
obligation.” The “protection buyer” will pay a fixed fee (the
“CDS premium”), typically every month or quarter, to the
“protection seller.” In the event of specific “credit events,”
such as a default on the reference obligation, the protection
seller will be obligated to make a payment to the protection
buyer or purchase the reference obligation at par. For this
reason, buying protection is very similar to having a short
position, and selling protection is similar to taking a long
position.
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CLO

Collateralized loan obligation. A security backed by a pool of
corporate loans, issued often by firms with low credit ratings
or by private equity firms conducting leveraged buyouts
[Troy Segal, “Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO),”
Investopedia, updated March 10, 2022,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/clo.asp].

CMBS

Commercial Mortgage-backed securities. Mortgage-backed
securities backed by commercial mortgages, e.g., mortgages
secured by a first lien on commercial properties, such as office
buildings, retail properties, multifamily rental buildings,
hotels, and industrial facilities.

Correlation trading

Dealers’ correlation trading desks create and sell (or buy)
tranches of risk backed by portfolios of corporate credit (or
ABS securities). Because they are trading only slices of the risk
of the underlying portfolio, they need to hedge that risk using
smaller quantities of CDS on each of the underlying credits in
the portfolio. The key variable in determining the proper
hedge ratios is the correlation of default risk among and
between the credits in the portfolio.

CUSIP

Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures. A
unique identifying code for securities.

DCP

Dynamic Credit Partners. A CDO manager firm founded in
2003 by Jim Finkel and Tonko Gast.

Delta hedging

An options trading strategy aimed at reducing the risk
associated with price movements in the underlying [James
Chen, “Delta Hedging,” Investopedia, updated January 28,
2021,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/deltahedging.asp].

DTI

Debt-to-income ratio. An important statistic in assessing the
credit quality of a mortgage. Indicates the borrower’s ability
to make the required payments on the mortgage. Usually
calculated as the required monthly mortgage payment
divided by the borrower’s monthly income. Some versions of
DTI also add other installment debt payments (such as auto
loan payments) to the numerator.
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Freddie and Fannie

Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Formally known as the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (FHLMC) and the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA). Freddie and Fannie are
government-sponsored enterprises that support the
mortgage and housing markets by purchasing or
guaranteeing prime mortgages. Most of those mortgages are
then securitized into a special type of MBS, which is extremely
liquid and trades at very tight spreads. The majority of
mortgages originated in the US are purchased by or
guaranteed by Freddie and Fannie.

GFC

Global Financial Crisis.

Hedge funds

Private investment funds managed by sophisticated
managers. Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds have wide
latitude to invest in very risky assets, use leverage, or take
short positions.

HPA

Home (or house price appreciation. The aggregate change in
house prices over a period of time. The primary index used to
measure HPA is the Case-Shiller index, which publishes data
at the US national level, as well as for many large metropolitan
areas. HPA is important for mortgage credit, since the value of
the house is the collateral securing the mortgage.

Intex

An independent analytics company that developed a system
for monitoring and analyzing a variety of MBS and ABS
products, including subprime RMBS and CDOs. In the years
before the GFC, a significant number of investors in these
products used Intex as their primary analysis tool.

ISDA

An “ISDA” is shorthand for an “ISDA Master Agreement,”
which is the standard document that governs all forms of
swap agreements, including CDS.

LTV

Loan-to-value ratio. An important statistic in assessing the
credit quality of a mortgage. Indicates how much equity the
homeowner has in the property.

MBS

Mortgage-backed securities. A general term for ABS in which
a pool of mortgages is securitized.
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NAIC

National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The NAIC
sets rules for how much regulatory capital, or reserves,
insurance companies are required to hold against assets in
their general account. Previously, the required amounts were
generally based on the asset’s rating from a rating agency such
as Moody’s or S&P.

Negative basis trade

A trade in which a bond or ABS tranche is purchased and then
the owner also uses a CDS to buy protection on that same
bond or tranche. If the spread on the bond is higher than the
cost of the CDS protection, the owner will earn the net
difference. Although counterintuitive, this is referred to as a
“negative basis” (for most corporate bonds, the bond spread
is usually lower than the CDS spread, which is a positive
basis). Regulated banks and insurance companies often
executed this trade by buying AAA CDO tranches and then
buying protection using CDS (or sometimes an insurance
policy) from a monoline insurer. The risk was deemed to be
zero, so the regulatory capital requirements was also zero.

New Century

A large subprime mortgage origination company. It was the
first significant company of this kind to file for bankruptcy, in
April 2007, an event that is considered one of the primary
turning points for the subprime market.

Notional (value)

A number referenced in swap agreements to be used as the
basis for calculations of the payments to be made under the
swap. For example, in the case of a credit default swap, if the
notional is $5 million, and the premium is 2%, then the
protection buyer will pay $100,000 per year to the protection
seller ($5 million x 2%). If a loss event occurs on the
underlying reference security, then the protection buyer will
receive payments equal to the losses that would have been
realized had they owned $5 million of that reference security.
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NRSRO

Nationally recognized statistical rating organization. The
2006 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act formalized US
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) oversight of the
industry in an effort to ensure that only qualified firms that
had been approved by the agency as NRSROs were issuing
ratings for financial instruments and entities that were being
relied on by investors. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act expanded
the SEC’s oversight authority and pushed regulators, which
had also relied on ratings in judging a bank’s risk level, to
develop alternative measures of creditworthiness,
introducing the “investment-grade” label. Institutional
investors remain a key end-user of the NRSRO ratings.
Currently, nine firms are registered as NRSROs; however,
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s have dominated the industry,
responsible for more than 80% of ratings across all asset
classes in 2018.

OTM

Out of the money. A term used to describe an option in which
the underlying security is less or more than the strike price, in
the case of a call or put, respectively. The owner of an out of
the money option will not elect to exercise that option. The
opposite would be “ITM,” or in the money, in which case the
option would be exercised profitably by the owner. When the
underlying security is trading at the strike price, the option is
“ATM,” or at the money.

OWIC

Offers wanted in “comp” (competition). Similar to a BWIC.
When used in the context of the CDS market, “offers” means
offers of protection. Offering protection, or selling protection,
is comparable to buying a bond, as both are a long risk
position. In the years prior to the GFC, hedge funds that
wanted to short specific subprime tranches conducted OWICs.
CDO managers often used these OWICs to ramp up synthetic
CDOs. In this case, the winning offer would be the one at the
lowest CDS premium.

Pool strats

Pool stratifications. Tables commonly found in the marketing
materials for RMBS and other asset-backed securities. These
tables show how various important characteristics of the
underlying mortgages are distributed within the pool. For
example, an RMBS may have thousands of loans, each with a
different LTV; the pool strats might include a table showing
the distribution of LTVs within the pool.
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Repo

Repurchase agreement. A short-term financing arrangement
for liquid securities. The security owner sells the security to
the counterparty and simultaneously agrees to repurchase it
on a specific day and at a specific price (based on an implied
interest rate, the “repo rate”). Most repos mature the next day
and roll over day to day until terminated by one party.

RMBS

Residential Mortgage-backed securities. Mortgage-backed
securities backed by residential mortgages, e.g., mortgages
secured by a first lien on single-family houses. Some RMBS
pools entirely comprised prime quality mortgages, and this
remains true today. Before the GFC, separate RMBS pools
were created that used only subprime mortgages.

RTC

Resolution Trust Corp. A quasi-governmental entity
established by the US federal government in 1989 to help
resolve the savings and loan crisis by managing failed banks,
S&Ls, and thrifts, and disposing of loans on their balance
sheets. One of the most efficient tools was to securitize
commercial mortgages; this process helped spur the
development of the then-nascent CMBS industry.

SIV

Structured investment vehicle. SIVs were entities used by
large banks to move highly rated, lower yielding assets off of
their balance sheets. This made the banks appear to be less
leveraged than they were. Although the SIVs were legally
separate entities from the sponsoring banks, they were
funded with short-term commercial paper (CP). If the SIV was
unable to roll the CP at a low enough interest rate, the
sponsoring bank was legally obligated, via a “liquidity put,” to
purchase the CP themselves. This occurred at some banks in
2008.

SPAC

Special purpose acquisition company. A company with no
commercial operations formed to raise capital for acquiring
or merging with an existing company [Julie Young, “Special
Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC),” Investopedia,
updated March 14, 2022,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spac.asp].

405

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

SPV

Special purpose vehicle. An SPV is the legal entity that issues
an RMBS (or a CDO or other type of asset-backed security). It
is a corporation or trust that is created at the time of issuance.
It will own the underlying pool of mortgages or other assets,
and it will issue the tranches that are backed by the cash flows
from those assets. The entity will be legally limited to that sole
purpose, and it may not conduct other business, acquire other
assets, or issue additional debt or equity.

“Super seniors”

In some CDOs (and other types of ABS), there would be two
AAA tranches, one of which was senior to the other. They
would be referred to as the “super senior” and the “junior
AAA.” Super seniors were deemed to be extremely low risk,
and most buyers essentially treated them as risk-free.

TABX index

Tranched ABX. Each ABX index represents the risk of a
portfolio of subprime RMBS tranches, whereas TABX
represented slices of the risk of that subprime RMBS portfolio.
For example, a “10–20” TABX tranche bore losses only after
the ABX index sustained a 10% loss and lost its entire value
when the ABX index had sustained a 20% loss. So, a TABX
tranche had a risk profile similar to a tranche of a subprime
CDO.

Tranche

A security issued by any type of ABS. Most ABS structures
have many tranches. Each tranche of an ABS will have a
different level of seniority. When losses occur within the ABS
asset pool, the most junior tranche will absorb those losses
first, while more senior tranches will be paid off in full. The
varying levels of risk and seniority allow more senior tranches
to be rated at higher levels (with the most senior tranche often
rated AAA). Conversely, the yield promised to more senior
tranches will be lower.
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